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Abstract. In this paper we compared the time required for the successful jamming of 
remote controlled improvised explosive devices activation using active and responsive 
jamming methods. As a representative of active jamming method we analyzed jamming 
signal generation using frequency sweep. For the analysis of the possible activating 
signal presence based on responsive jamming procedures we first supposed Fast 
Fourier Transform (FFT) implementation and compared its analysis rate to the rate of 
sweep jamming. Taking into account the current technology state, it is proved that the 
time required to achieve the successful jamming relied on FFT analysis may be less 
than in the case of active sweep jamming. After that we considered pros and cons for 
energy detector and matched filter detector implementation in responsive jamming. For 
these two detector types it is shown how to determine the number of analysis blocks to 
achieve approximately the same number of collected samples as in the case of FFT 
implementation, starting from the probabilities of false detection and miss of detection.  
Key words: Active and Responsive jamming, RCIED - remote controlled improvised 
explosive devices, Frequency sweep, Fast Fourier Transform, Energy 
Detector, Matched Filter, Jamming Reliability 
1. INTRODUCTION 
The common characteristic of all remote controlled improvised explosive devices 
(RCIED) is that they are activated by wirelessly transmitted messages. The results of RCIED 
activation message could be disastrous regarding people lives (VIP persons) and the 
equipments damages. All elements related to activation signal characteristics (signal power, 
frequency, implemented modulation method, message duration) are completely unknown. 
This fact produces great problems in the realization of RCIED activation jammers. 
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Contributions [2] and [3] provide a general overview of jammers types, communications 
jamming requirements and their efficiency analysis. Modern communications jamming 
principles and techniques may be found in [4].    
There are two basic approaches to the jammer implementation. The first one is active 
jamming, which consisted of continuous predefined jamming signals sending independently 
of the RCIED activating message characteristics. In this concept there are no „look through“ 
phases to detect the activation message existence and the jamming signal characteristics are 
selected in general using previous experience and expectations. The most important freely 
selected jamming signal parameter is the RF signal level. This level has to be as high as 
possible to successfully prevent activating message reception. Two key features which are 
not optimally chosen relate to continuous jamming regardless of RCIED activation message 
existence and the RF jamming signal level necessary for jamming successfulness due to the 
fact that the activation signal level is unknown. 
The alternative approach to jammer implementation is responsive jamming concept. 
In this case the jamming signal characteristics can be optimized using look through 
intervals to detect the activation message existence and its level. That’s why it is possible 
to send the jamming signal only during activation message presence and jamming signal 
level can be adjusted to the activation message level in order to successfully deny the 
threat. A wide range of active and responsive jammers may be found in [5]-[14]. 
It may be concluded from this short presentation of active and responsive jamming 
characteristics that active jamming is always successful, while responsive jamming 
efficiency depends on activation message detection reliability. The question is whether 
responsive jamming reliability may be higher than for active jamming. In this paper we 
compare the reliability of mostly implemented active jamming method – frequency 
sweep [15]-[19] to the reliability of a representative method for activating signal eventual 
presence detection in order to generate jamming signal according to the activation signal 
characteristics by implementation of Fast Fourier Transform (FFT) in the analysis [14].             
A brief principle schematic of RCIED activation signal detection is explained in Section 
2. After that the method for RCIED activation signal frequency spectrum estimation based 
on FFT analysis is presented in Section 3 with the emphasis on the required time for 
calculation. Sections 4 and 5 deal with the specificities of energy detector and matched filter 
detector implementation for RCIED activation message detection. The emphasis is on the 
determination of collected samples number. Section 6 is devoted to frequency sweep 
jamming and to determination of required time to realize one complete jamming cycle. In 
Section 7 jamming reliability on the basis of FFT analysis is compared to the frequency 
sweep jamming reliability, whereby two special purpose processors are considered for FFT 
calculation. Reliability estimation is based on the required time to allow successful 
jamming. Section 8 is focused on the presentation how to determine the necessary number 
of analysis blocks in energy detection or matched filter detection to achieve the comparable 
sample collection rate of these two detectors to FFT based detector. At the end, the paper 
conclusion is given in Section 9. 
2. PRINCIPLES OF DETECTION PROCESS 
Main principles of RCIED activation signal detection may be explained using 
simplified block-schema presented in Fig. 1. 
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The first phase in detector function is signal samples collecting (block SCOL). After that 
follows processing of these samples (block PROC). The final step is making a decision 
about (eventual) presence of RCIED activation signal on the base of a set of comparison 
rules (block DECISION). These comparison rules are adjusted to the applied method of 
signal samples processing. 
This paper is mainly devoted to the block PROC. The analyzed methods are FFT, 
energy detector and matched filter. When the second or the third of these three methods 
is implemented, digital filter precedes the phase of processing. 
According to the available literature, there are also other methods which are less often 
applied for spectrum sensing, but they are possible candidates for RCIED activation signal 
detection. Some of them are waveform based detection, eigen-value based detection, 
wavelet based edge detection, ciclostationary feature detection [20] and so on. These 
methods, as generally less often applied ones, are beyond the scope of this paper.      
SCOL PROC DECISION
 
Fig. 1 Block schema of RCIED activation signal detector 
3. SIGNAL SPECTRUM ESTIMATION ON THE FFT BASE 
FFT is the calculation procedure, which allows relatively fast estimation of discretized 
signal frequency spectrum. Starting from n time samples of analyzed signal, this procedure 
gives a snapshot of signal frequency spectrum also in n points, i.e. n spectrum lines are 
obtained. FFT is the optimum method taking into account the required number of 
mathematical operations for signal spectrum determination. There are (n/2)·log2 (n) 
complex multiplications and n·log2 (n) complex additions [21]. The limitation for n is that 
the condition n=2a must be satisfied, where a is the positive integer number. This is a 
significant saving in the number of mathematical operations and in the required calculation 
time comparing to the classical method of frequency spectrum estimation by Discrete 
Fourier Transform (DFT). Namely, it is necessary to perform n2 complex multiplications 
and n2–n complex additions to obtain n frequency spectrum components by DFT on the 
base of n time samples. 
Let us suppose that fs is the frequency of analyzed signal sampling. The sample 
acquisition time is then: 
 
s
nt
f
  (1) 
The frequency resolution on the base of sample acquisition time may be determined as: 
1 sfdf
T n
       (2) 
Therefore, frequency resolution is improved when acquisition time is increased, i.e. the 
space between frequency spectral components of the analyzed signal is lower. 
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Constant advancements in processor realization technology and mathematical algorithm 
improvements are visible in two aspects of FFT calculation progress. On the one side the 
number of points in which frequency spectrum is determined is constantly increased, and on 
the other side the required FFT calculation time for some exactly determined number of 
frequency spectrum components is constantly decreased, chronologically, successively 
according to presentations in [22], [23], [21], [24]. We selected two approaches referenced 
in [21] and [24] due to very fast processing algorithms.       
Data presented in [24] is related to the FFT calculation time as a function of the 
number of signal time samples implemented for FFT calculation, i.e. as a function of the 
obtained frequency components number in the analyzed spectrum. The presented data is 
for processor clock of 1GHz. It is further emphasized in [24] that improvement may be 
achieved by processor clock speed increase to 1.25GHz. Besides, it is stated in [25] that 
maximum processor clock frequency may be even 1.4GHz. On the base of these data, the 
FFT calculation time (Tcal in ms) is presented in Table 1 as a function of the number of 
points used in a calculation, for a processor clock of 1.25GHz and for 8 processor cores. 
The value of the constant K is 1024 in the first column of the Table 1. 
The time of FFT calculation (Tcal in μs) according to the data emphasized in [21] is 
presented in the Table 2. The processor clock in this case may be in the range between 
60MHz and 150MHz [26]. That’s why data are presented for the mean processor 
frequency of 100MHz. FFT hardware accelerator (HWAFFT) is one of the parts in the 
processor implemented according to [21]. HWAFFT is intended for faster FFT 
calculation. Data in Table 2 are related to the case when HWAFFT is implemented. The 
number of points is relatively small (till 1024) where FFT is calculated comparing to the 
number of points, where FFT results are presented in Table 1. 
In accordance to Fig. 1, the total time, which is needed for signal analysis in a jammer 
(Tan) before (eventually) starting RCIED activation jamming signal emission, consists of 
three components: sample acquisition time (T), FFT calculation time (Tcal) and the time, 
which is necessary to compare obtained signal frequency components after FFT 
calculation (Tcomp) in order to determine whether it is necessary to start jamming. When 
considering the last component (Tcomp), there is not such a data in a literature, because 
calculation is very specific. For our analysis, we supposed that taking equal values of Tcal 
and Tcomp is a quite good approximation, i.e. 
2an cal comp cal
s
nT T T T T
f
         (3) 
Table 1 The time of FFT calculation as a function of the number of calculation points for 
the processor presented in [24]  
Number of points for FFT calculation Calculation time Tcal [ms] (8 cores, 1.25GHz) 
16K 0.1051 
32K 0.1584 
64K 0.2517 
128K 0.5128 
256K 0.9488 
512K 2.4824 
1024K 5.1226 
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Table 2 The time of FFT calculation as a function of the number of calculation points for 
the processor presented in [21] 
Number of points for FFT calculation Calculation time Tcal [μs] (with HWAFFT, 100 MHz) 
8 1.3 
16 1.7 
32 3.21 
64 4.36 
128 9.12 
256 16.68 
512 37.4 
1024 73.15 
4. RCIED ACTIVATION SIGNAL DETECTION BY ENERGY DETECTOR 
Energy detector is the simplest techniques for signal detection [27]. In the same time 
it is a very often applied technique. It is necessary first to measure signal energy in the 
pre-defined frequency band. The measured signal energy is then compared to the energy 
threshold according to the equation 
2
1
( ) ( ( ))
N
n
E x x n 

      (4) 
where N is the number of samples implemented for signal energy estimation, x(n) is the 
amplitude of nth sample and γ is the threshold power.   
Although simple for implementation, energy detector performances are degraded due to 
noise uncertainty (noise level is variable during time) and background interference [28]. 
Noise uncertainty may be bounded or unbounded [29]. As a consequence of noise 
uncertainty, the detection by energy detector may become even impossible under relatively 
low value of signal to noise ratio (SNR) [30]. In other words, there exists a SNR wall: 
detection is possible only when signal power is higher than noise power uncertainty.  
For the analysis in this paper and for the comparison of energy detector characteristics 
with the characteristics of other methods for reactive jamming the most important parameter 
is the number of samples (N) to achieve necessary detection reliability. Our analysis is based 
on the formula for N from [27] [31]:       
1 1 2
2
( ( ) 1 2 ( ))
2
f dQ P SNR Q P
N
SNR
    
     (5) 
where Pf is probability of false detection (detector announces signal presence although 
there is no signal), Pd is probability of successful detection and Q
-1 is inverse Gaussian-Q 
function. In other words, Q-1 is the inverse of 
 
2
1
21( )
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u
x
Q x e du


  
   (6) 
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Fig. 2 The necessary number of samples (N) when energy detector is applied as a function 
of signal-to-noise (SNR) ratio without noise uncertainty for different values Pmd =Pf. 
One additional important parameter in energy detection systems analysis is miss in 
detection Pmd (detector does not detect a signal although it exists). Probabilities Pd and 
Pmd are connected by the equation   
 1md dP P       (7) 
Fig. 2 presents the necessary number of samples (N) as a function of signal-to-noise ratio 
(SNR). The results are presented for equal values of Pf and Pmd. There is no noise uncertainty 
which means that optimum detector threshold value exists independently of SNR. For small 
SNR signal detection is always possible, but the value of N significantly increases. 
In our concrete implementation it is more important to achieve low value of Pmd than 
to achieve low value of Pf. In other words, consequences of miss in detection are more 
severe (RCIED is activated because there is no jamming) than if the detection is false 
(only jamming signal is waste generated). That’s why the results for probability values 
satisfying the condition Pmd<Pf are presented in Fig. 3. 
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Fig. 3 The necessary number of sa ples (N) when energy detector is applie  as a function of 
signal-to-noise (SNR) ratio without noise uncertainty for different values Pmd <Pf. 
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Noise uncertainty is modelled in such a way that the value ρ-(1/ρ), where it is ρ>1, is 
subtracted from the value SNR in the denominator of equation (5). This means that noise 
power, instead of having power equal to σ2 when noise is completely defined, now has 
the value of power between (1/ρ)·σ2 and ρ·σ2. SNR-wall is presented by the fourth graph 
in Fig. 3. Even for a very small noise uncertainty value ρ=0.25dB or ρ=1.059 when it is 
Pf=0.1 and Pmd=0.01 the value of N tends to infinity for SNR~-9.3dB and below this 
value -9.3dB it is not possible to detect a signal. As a conclusion it may be said that it is 
very important to constantly monitor the noise level and to adjust threshold value 
according to instantaneous noise level and in this way to avoid SNR-wall appearance. 
5. RCIED ACTIVATION SIGNAL DETECTION BY MATCHED FILTER 
The second often implemented technique of spectrum analysis is based on the method of 
matched filters. The main property of such filters is that they are optimum linear filters 
applied for signal detection in white Gaussian noise, meaning that maximum SNR is 
achieved by their implementation [32]. Although this property contributes to easier and 
faster signal detection, the drawback of matched filter implementation is that it is necessary 
to precisely know time characteristics of the signal which has to be detected. Such 
knowledge is possible in some implementation areas, as for example, in cognitive radio 
[32], [33]. But, if considering RCIED activation signal jamming, there is a great variety of 
possible and, in the same time, unpredictable activation techniques. They usually depend on 
the devices which may be easily purchased in some country (region) and easily adapted for 
its malicious function. The number of applied solution types is not great in the analysis 
presented in [34] with the dominant implementation of one type, thus simplifying and 
limiting the necessary number of different matched filters. Nevertheless, application of 
matched filters is not quite suitable for RCIED activation signal detection and the analysis 
of this method has more theoretical than practical significance. 
Similarly to the analysis of energy detector, the necessary number of samples to 
achieve the desired probability of false alarm and probability of successful signal 
detection may be determined on the base of equation from [27]: 
1 1 2( ( ) ( ))f dQ P Q P
N
SNR
 
     (8) 
Fig. 4 presents the necessary number of samples (N) as a function of signal-to-noise 
ratio (SNR) when matched filter is implemented. The results are obtained by equation (8) 
and are presented for equal values of Pf and Pmd. After that, Fig. 5 presents the 
corresponding results if Pmd<Pf. It is necessary to collect and analyze lower number of 
samples to achieve the same values Pf and Pmd as when energy detector is implemented. 
This is noticeable if graphs from Figs. 2 and 4, as well as graphs from Figs. 3 and 5 are 
mutually compared. 
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Fig. 4 The necessary number of samples (N) when matched filter is applied as a function 
of signal-to-noise (SNR) ratio for different values Pmd =Pf. 
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Fig. 5 The necessary number of samples (N) when matched filter is applied as a function 
of signal-to-noise (SNR) for different values Pmd <Pf. 
6. ACTIVE JAMMING USING FREQUENCY SWEEP 
Frequency sweep is often used method of active jamming. It is necessary to linearly 
change signal frequency step by step from its minimum value (f1) to the maximum one (f2) 
in order to realize a sweep. It is a readily implemented jamming method, because a 
significantly smaller power is necessary in relation to wideband jamming based on Additive 
White Gaussian Noise (AWGN) [17] - [19]. Linear frequency change of jamming signal 
frequency is practically approximated by a stepwise change, as it is presented in Fig. 6. 
There are two parameters, besides outmost sweep signal frequencies f1 and f2, which model 
signal frequency change: frequency change step (f∆) and each step time interval duration 
while the same signal frequency is generated (T∆). 
  Reliability Analysis of Different RCIED Activation Signal Responsive Jamming Techniques... 467 
 
f
f1
f2
t
τsw
Wsw
f∆
T∆
 
Fig. 6 Practical implementation of frequency sweep in the RCIED activation message 
active jamming. 
The total step number in jamming realization may be represented by an equation: 
2 1f f
N
f

      (9) 
while the duration of one total sweep cycle may be represented as: 
2 1
sw
f f
T N T T
f
 


        (10) 
7. COMPARISON OF THE ACTIVE AND RESPONSIVE FFT JAMMING RELIABILITY 
The starting data in our analysis will be the required time to realize sweep jamming of 
RCIED activation signal under the condition that at least once jamming signal frequency 
and RCIED activation message frequency are approximately equal. After that we shall 
determine the total time from the beginning of the analyzed signal sample acquisition 
including FFT calculation time until the start of jamming signal emission on the detected 
RCIED activation signal frequency. In order to achieve comparison requirements of these 
two results, we shall suppose that the number of steps in sweep procedure (N) is equal to 
the number of points where the analyzed signal spectrum is estimated (n). 
There is a number of D/A converters, which may be implemented for jamming signal 
generation. One typical example may be found in [35]. This D/A converter is used in our 
jammer solution [16]. It generates analog signal from the samples, whose maximum 
frequency is pretty high (fs=3.5GHz), thus enabling maximum generated signal frequency 
fg=1.4GHz. 
Let us suppose that RCIED activation jamming is realized by jamming signal generation 
in a frequency band between f1=20MHz and f2≈1.33GHz. We shall further define the 
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frequency change step f∆=20kHz, and the frequency sweep step duration T∆=200ns (very 
short time, a greater time is used in a practical realization - T∆=1μs or more [16]). On the 
base of (9) we obtain the number of steps in a sweep procedure realization N=65536=64K, 
and on the base of (10) sweep procedure duration is Tsw≈13.1ms. 
Let us now have a device for responsive jamming, which collects the analyzed signal 
samples (performs A/D conversion) at the same frequency fs=3.5GHz as the frequency of 
samples for D/A converter [36]. Number of samples that need to be collected, and 
consequently obtained number of the analyzed signal discrete frequency components is the 
same as the number of sweep steps (n=65536=64K). In this way it is achieved that the 
accuracy of jamming signal frequency df according to (2) is the same as the step of sweep 
signal frequency change f∆ according to (9). In the case of responsive jamming, the signal 
sample acquisition time from (1) will be T≈18.7μs, while on the basis of Table 1 the FFT 
calculation time is Tcal=251.7μs. According to our adopted approximation it is also 
Tcomp=251.7μs. Taking into account these three values, the total analysis time on the basis of 
(3) is Tan=522.1μs. 
Comparing two time intervals which are the main indicators of active and responsive 
jamming reliability (Tsw and Tan), it is concluded that responsive jamming on the basis of 
FFT implementation is significantly more reliable (in our example ≈25 times) than active 
jamming by frequency sweep. One additional element which is an advantage of responsive 
jamming is the fact that after the analysis process (Tan) jamming may be performed only on 
the detected activation signal frequency with no time limit. In the case of active jamming, 
signal frequency is only during a short time period T∆ approximately equal to the activation 
signal frequency. Therefore, due to greater jamming time it is also higher the probability 
that jamming is successful when responsive jamming is implemented. 
Fig. 7 presents the results of reliability comparison of responsive jamming based on 
FFT analysis according to data from [24] in relation to active jamming based on 
frequency sweep. When active jamming is considered, jamming time on each frequency 
is adopted to be 200ns. Two extreme cases are chosen for responsive jamming: a) the 
first one, which allows maximum analysis speed (maximum specified processor clock 
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Fig. 7 The reliability of responsive jamming on the FFT basis according to [24] in relation 
to active frequency sweep jamming. 
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frequency 1.4GHz and maximum number of processor cores – 8) and b) the second one, 
which corresponds to the minimum analysis speed (minimum processor clock frequency 
1GHz and minimum number of processor cores – 1). The required number of processor 
cycles for FFT calculation as a function of the number of FFT points is taken according 
to Table 1 from [24]. After that, it is determined the necessary time for FFT analysis in 
some cases. The graph in Fig. 7 indicates higher reliability of responsive jamming on the 
base of FFT in relation to active jamming using frequency sweep in all jamming 
conditions, because the calculated relation of jamming reliability is always between two 
extreme cases presented in Fig. 7 (i.e. this relation is always greater than 1). 
Fig. 8 presents the results of reliability comparison of responsive jamming based on 
FFT analysis according to data from [21] in relation to active jamming based on 
frequency sweep. The processor implemented for FFT calculation operates on lower 
frequencies (between 60MHz and 150MHz) [26] than in the example from Fig. 7. That’s 
why it is adopted that analyzed signal sampling is realized on a significantly lower 
frequency (800MHz) than in the example in Fig. 7. This further means that jamming is 
realized in this case for lower frequencies (till 320MHz). 
0
0,5
1
1,5
2
2,5
8 16 32 64 128 256 512 1024
N FFT
T
s
w
/T
a
n
.
150MHz with HWAFFT 60MHz no HWAFFT 100MHz with HWAFFT 100MHz no HWAFFT
 
Fig. 8 The reliability of responsive jamming on the FFT basis according to [21] in 
relation to active frequency sweep jamming. 
The results in Fig. 8 are presented separately in the case that HWAFFT is used for an 
analysis and when it is avoided. The maximum processing rate in this case is achieved if 
HWAFFT is used together with maximum processor clock frequency (150MHz), while the 
minimum processing rate is if HWAFFT is not used and the processor clock frequency is 
minimum (60MHz). These results are presented by first two vertical graphs for each number 
of frequencies in FFT analysis. Besides these two graphs, the results for mean processor 
clock frequency (100MHz) are presented when HWAFFT is used and when it is not used. 
The required number of processor cycles to calculate FFT for some number of points in 
FFT analysis is determined on the base of Table 3, i.e. Table 4 from [21]. 
Using the analysis the results in Fig. 8 it can be concluded that the application of 
HWAFFT allows also in this case that responsive jamming using FFT may be more 
reliable than the active jamming by frequency sweep (except for the smallest number of 
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analyzed frequencies – 8, which is unlikely to occur in practice). On the contrary, if 
HWAFFT is not used, responsive jamming reliability using FFT becomes lower than the 
reliability of frequency sweep jamming (because the relation Tsw/Tan<1). For the mean 
processor clock frequency (100MHz) and with the HWAFFT implementation for the 
smaller number of points in the analysis, frequency sweep implementation is more 
reliable, while for the greater number of points the analysis on the base of FFT is better. 
8. PERFORMANCES OF ENERGY DETECTOR AND MATCHED FILTER DETECTOR  
ON THE BASE OF MAIN FFT PARAMETERS 
In our further analysis we are going to investigate achievable performances of energy 
detector and matched filter detector on the base of 64K collected (analyzed) signal 
samples, as in the case of FFT analysis. In this way analysis procedure duration is 
comparable for these two methods. The time of sample collection is exactly the same as 
we suppose the same sampling rate in two presented cases. 
Fig. 9 presents the simplified timing diagram of a jammer realized on the base of energy 
detector. The value SNR is relatively low when the whole available frequency bandwidth is 
analyzed at once, such that the necessary number of samples (N) for the analysis is higher 
than 64K. That’s why the complete frequency bandwidth of the analyzed system is separated 
into n distinguished blocks, meaning that bandpass filtering (BPF) is the first step at each of n 
executed block inputs for energy detection (ED). At the output of each block is comparator 
(COMP) and after that (in the block DECISION) is determined whether RCIED activation 
signal is present. The principle structure is the same if energy detector is replaced by matched 
filter (MF), except that designations ED1...EDn in Fig. 9 have to be replaced by MF1...MFn. 
There are two algorithm execution possibilities: 1. sequential processing in each of n blocks 
(Fig. 9a)); 2. parallel processing in n blocks when considering the elapsed time (Fig. 9b)). Of 
course, the combination of these two structures is also possible, but this time scenario is 
beyond the scope of our analysis. If the white noise power in the whole available frequency 
bandwidth is designated by σv
2, the power at the output of each of n bandpass filters is σv
2/n, 
because white noise frequency spectrum is considered to be uniform and it is split into n 
equal frequency portions. It means that SNR in the energy detector where RCIED activation 
signal appears is n times higher than without spectrum separation. 
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b) 
Fig. 9 The timing diagram of the energy detector based jammer: a) sequential processing; 
b) parallel processing 
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Fig. 10 presents the total number of analyzed samples (N) to successively perform 
energy detection as a function of the number of blocks (frequency spectrum parts) n when 
SNR=-20dB for the whole frequency bandwidth in the case that sequential processing is 
applied as in Fig. 9a). The total number of collected samples is determined as a product of 
the number of sequentially realized blocks and the necessary number of samples for each 
block to achieve the noise power σv
2/n. The results are presented for three pairs of values Pf 
and Pmd when there is no noise power uncertainty and for one of these parameter pairs when 
the value of noise power uncertainty is ρ=0.25dB. We want to have 64K analyzed samples 
as in the case of FFT based detection and we may determine the necessary number of 
sequential blocks for different Pf and Pmd. For example, when it is Pf=0.1 and Pmd=0.01, it is 
enough to have n=5 sequential blocks when there is no noise power uncertainty. This value 
increases to even n=24 when noise power uncertainty is only ρ=0.25dB. It is expected that 
such a low ρ is very rare, because there are usually a lot of different signals besides white 
noise in the wireless system surrounding. 
 
1,E+03
1,E+04
1,E+05
1,E+06
1,E+07
1 10 100
number of sequential blocks
N
Pf=0.1;Pmd=0.01 Pf=0.01;Pmd=0.001 Pf=0.001;Pmd=0.000001 Pf=0.1;Pmd=0.01;ro=0.25dB
 
Fig. 10 The necessary number of analyzed samples (N) as a function of the number of 
analysis blocks in the case of energy detector implementation when SNR=-20dB 
for the whole frequency bandwidth when sequential processing is used. 
Fig. 11 presents the total number of analyzed samples (N) to perform energy detection as 
a function of the number of blocks (frequency spectrum parts) n when SNR=-20dB  for the 
whole frequency bandwidth in the case that parallel processing is applied as in Fig. 9b). The 
parameters on this figure are the same as for Fig. 10. If there is no noise power uncertainty, it 
is enough to have only 2 parallel blocks and to collect about 64K samples when it is Pf=0.1 
and Pmd=0.01. With the noise power uncertainty we ought to have 14 blocks.   
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Fig. 11 The necessary number of analyzed samples (N) as a function of the number of 
analysis blocks in the case of energy detector implementation when SNR=-20dB 
for the whole frequency bandwidth when parallel processing is used. 
 
Fig. 12 presents the total number of analyzed samples (N) to perform matched filter 
detection as a function of the number of blocks (frequency spectrum parts) n when   SNR=-
40dB for the whole frequency bandwidth in the case that sequential processing is applied as 
in Fig. 9a). The conditions for the graphical presentation are the same as in Fig. 10. In this 
case the number of necessary points for the analysis is independent of the number of applied 
sequential blocks. Such behaviour is the consequence of the fact that SNR is linear factor in 
the denominator of equation (8). It means that algorithm characteristics may not be 
improved by sequential processing for matched filter implementation. Opposite to this, SNR 
appears as the quadratic factor in the denominator of equation (5) for energy detector. Also 
SNR appears under the square root of the numerator in the same equation. Such complex 
dependence causes decreasing of the number of necessary samples when the number of 
analysis blocks increase in the case of energy detector implementation. 
 
1,E+05
1,E+06
1 10 100
number of sequential blocks
N
Pf=0.1;Pmd=0.01 Pf=0.01;Pmd=0.001 Pf=0.001;Pmd=0.000001  
Fig. 12 The necessary number of analyzed samples (N) as a function of the number of 
analysis blocks in the case of matched filter detector implementation when SNR= 
-40dB for the whole frequency bandwidth when sequential processing is used. 
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Fig. 13 presents the total number of analyzed samples (N) to perform matched filter 
detection as a function of the number of blocks (frequency spectrum parts) n when   SNR=-
40dB for the whole frequency bandwidth in the case that parallel processing is applied as in 
Fig. 9b). The results are presented for hundred times worse value of SNR than in the case of 
energy detector consideration. This is one more proof of the better matched filter 
performances comparing to energy detector. 
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Fig. 13 The necessary number of analyzed samples (N) as a function of the number of 
analysis blocks in the case of matched filter detector implementation when SNR= 
-40dB for the whole frequency bandwidth when parallel processing is used. 
Energy detector or matched filter detector as the base of RCIED activation jammer are 
more suitable in the case when there is necessary to intercept only a frequency spectrum 
part. In such a case the number of sequential or parallel blocks on the block-schema from 
Fig. 9 is decreased as a consequence of increased SNR, making a solution practically 
realisable. This situation is presented in [34], where it is demonstrated that even in the area 
of significant military war activities, there is not too high number of implemented RCIED 
activation solution types. Therefore, if energy detector or matched filter detector supervises 
the wideband signal, the number of spectrum parts to which the whole frequency bandwidth 
is separated is relatively low (not more than 100 according to figures 10-13). As a 
consequence, each frequency part for detection is relatively wide and it may be efficiently 
jammed only by frequency limited noise (barrage) jamming. Opposite, FFT gives a lot of 
points where frequency spectrum is estimated (64K in the example in Section 7). That’s 
why jamming may be realized on one or more precisely defined frequencies implementing 
pure sinusoid (spot) jamming.    
The pipeline processing is one possibility to several times increase the analysis rate 
without significantly increasing hardware size. This possibility may be considered first of 
all when FFT method is applied, but also when energy detector or matched filter detector 
are considered. The principle details about pipeline processing in RCIED detection are 
found in [1], [37]. 
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8. CONCLUSIONS 
The results of the calculation presented in this paper have proved that responsive 
jamming may be more reliable than active jamming. This is the first paper contribution. The 
required time for secure jamming signal generation on the frequency of RCIED activation 
message is analyzed as a criterion of jamming reliability. As the result of complete analysis 
based on FFT, the frequency of RCIED activation signal is obtained, and jamming on the 
exactly determined frequency may be initiated. The results are compared for two 
processors, which are specialized for FFT calculation. One of these two processors provide 
that responsive jamming based on FFT implementation is more reliable than active jamming 
using frequency sweep. In this case analysis rate is several times, and even up to several 
tens of times higher when FFT is implemented in the analysis in relation to the frequency 
sweep rate. For the second analyzed processor reliability of responsive jamming depends on 
processor hardware characteristics such as the processor clock frequency and whether 
hardware accelerator (HWAFFT) is applied. If HWAFFT is included in the analysis with 
the higher processor clock frequency, jamming based on FFT analysis is certainly more 
reliable. On the contrary, if HWAFFT is not used with the lower processor clock frequency, 
the speed of FFT analysis may not approach jamming speed realized by frequency sweep. 
The second paper contribution is related to the possibilities of energy detector and 
matched filter detector implementation for RCIED activation responsive jamming. It is 
proved that these jamming types are more suitable for jamming of narrower frequency 
bands, because frequency spectrum is estimated in significantly lower number of points 
than it is the case with FFT analysis. The additional problem for energy detector and 
matched filter detector implementation is a priori unknown shape of RCIED activation 
signal and noise power level. To overcome these problems, these two detectors require 
collecting relatively high number of signal samples. It is explained how this number of 
samples may be reduced while considering the desired probabilities of false detection and 
miss of detection, as well as analysis rate (number of collected samples).   
It can be summarized that the results of comparative analysis presented in this paper 
prove that at up-to-date technological development level, RCIED activation responsive 
jamming may be very reliable and very often even more reliable than active jamming, 
especially when FFT analysis is considered. 
This paper is the extended and enhanced version of the contribution [1]. Comparing 
to [1], completely new sections are 2, 4, 5 and 8. Section 2 presents the principle block-
schema of the analyzed solutions to simplify readers following the text as two new 
methods are described in the paper. These two new methods are introduced in Sections 4 
and 5. The priority in the analysis is given to the determination of necessary number of 
samples to achieve comparable timing performances to the RCIED activation signal 
detector realized by FFT. The main new results for practical jammer realization are in the 
Section 8, where it is analyzed how to choose the most important jammer specification 
parameters: the necessary number of collected samples and the number of sequential or 
parallel blocks to achieve the desired jammer characteristics.      
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